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Comments
Section 16 of The Clayton Act:
Divestiture An Intended Type of
Injunctive Relief
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act' to complement the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 18902 in maintaining a competitive economy
by increasing government control over corporate growth 3 and by
providing redress to persons adversely affected by violations of the
regulations.4 Private litigants, under section 16 of the Clayton Act 5
1. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1987)).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1987)).
3. See Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FoRanH L.
REv. 569, 583 (1973) [hereinafter comment, Private Divestiture] (quoting Chairman of Senate
Judiciary Committee, testifying on the Senate floor, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914)). "It is
proposed, without amending the Sherman Antitrust Act ... to supplement that act by
denouncing and making unlawful certain trade practices which, while not covered by the act
because not amounting to restraint of commerce or monopoly in themselves, yet constitute
elements tending ultimately to violations of that act." Id.
4. Section 16 of the Clayton Act states:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ...
when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by the courts of equity.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1986).
5. Id.
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are entitled to sue for injunctive relief when threatened with loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.6 A question that remains
undecided is whether the injunctive relief authorized by section 16
includes the remedy of divestiture. Divestiture refers to a forced sale
of property, securities, or other assets unlawfully acquired by a
corporate defendant. 7 Since the federal circuit courts of appeal are
divided on the issue, the availability of a divestiture order for the
private litigant under section 16 rests on the location of the forum.'
Two leading cases highlight the split of authority among the circuit
courts regarding the availability of divestiture under section 16 of
the Clayton Act. The Ninth Circuit, in International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.,9 con-
cluded from the legislative history of section 16 that divestiture is
not a potential remedy under section 16 of the Clayton Act for the
private litigant. 0 The First Circuit, in CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v.
Arco Caribbean," rejected the decision of the Ninth Circuit and
concluded divestiture was a potential remedy under section 16.12 Both
decisions remain the law in the respective circuits. 3
6. Graves v. Cambria Steel Co., 298 F. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)) (the courts had held
that private suits to enjoin unlawful actions, in contrast to private actions for actual damages,
were not authorized by the Sherman Act; one of the purposes of the Clayton Act was to fill
this void by entitling individuals to injunctive relief in antitrust cases). See also Peacock,
Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48 Tax. L. REv. 54, 67 (1969).
7. Divesituture is distinguishable from the remedies of dissolution and divorcement, but
divestiture is broad enough to include them, as well. Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private
Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REv. 267,
270 n.21 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Availability of Divestiture]. Dissolution refers to the
termination of any illegal combination or association, including dissolution by divestiture or
divorcement. Id. Divorcement is a type of divestiture designed to separate an integrated firm
into smaller legal entities in order to cease antitrust violations occuring from the consolidation.
Note, The Use Of Divestiture In Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 261, 261 n.1
(1974) [hereinafter Note, The Use of Divestiture]. See generally F. Adams, Dissolution,
Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951).
8. Compare Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1060
(6th Cir. 1984) (section 16 does not create a private divestiture remedy) and Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975) (divestiture is not an
available remedy in private actions under § 16 of the Clayton Act); with CIA. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 429 (1st Cir. 1985) (declining to adopt a
per se limitation on § 16 forbidding an order for divestiture in private antitrust cases) and
NBO Industries Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 279 (3rd Cir.
1976) (divestiture was simply an inappropriate remedy under the facts) and Credit Bureau
Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 476 F.2d 989, (5th Cir. 1973), aff'g 358 F.Supp. 780, 797
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (a federal court has the power to order divestiture under § 16 of the Clayton
Act).
9. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 920 (reversing the district court and holding that Congress did not intend § 16
to permit private divestiture suits).
11. 754 F.2d 404 (Ist Cir. 1985).
12. Id. at 429.
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The purpose of this comment is to examine the legal and policy
issues concerning the availability of divestiture in private antitrust
litigation. In analyzing this controversy a brief examination will be
made of the history and purpose of the Clayton Act. 14 Next, the
language adopted by Congress in section 16 of the Clayton Act will
be evaluated. 5 This comment will also review the interpretations
accorded to the legislative history of section 16 by the ITT and Arco
Caribbean courts. 16 In addition, this comment will explore the policies
both in support of and against the availability of divestiture under
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 17 This comment will conclude that
injunctive relief, as referred to in section 16 of the Clayton Act, was
intended to include the remedy of divestiture.
OBjrCTIvEs OF SECTION 16 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in order to preserve a
competitive market place. 8 The Sherman Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade'9 and the mono-
polization of or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce. 20 By
1914, the Sherman Act, though a potent weapon against demonstrated
anticompetitive behavior, proved ineffectual against preventing cor-
porate integrations that might result in future monopoly.21 By enact-
ing section 7 of the Clayton Act, Congress prohibited mergers which
threaten to substantially lessen competition.2 Consequently, anticom-
petitive mergers may be prevented in their incipiency. 23 As a remedy
13. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 692 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (under the law of the Ninth Circuit the remedy of
divestiture is unavailable to private plaintiffs in antitrust suits); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive v.
Budget Rent-A-Car, 491 F.Supp. 1199, 1223 (D. Haw. 1980) (the court was bound by precedent,
since the Ninth Circuit has ruled that divestiture is unavailable in private actions).
14. See infra text and accompanying notes 19 through 37.
15. See infra text and accompanying notes 38 through 90.
16. See infra text and accompanying notes 91 through 150.
17. See infra text and accompanying notes 151 through 194.
18. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 268. See also United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 187-88 (1944) (recognizing that Congress has pro-
claimed the rule of the market place to be competition, not combination).
19. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1987).
20. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1987).
21. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 268.
22. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1987) (as amended section 7 applies to vertical as
well as horizontal acquisitions of stock and assets).
23. Id. The litigant need only demonstrate that a corporate acquisition may lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly to prove a section 7 violation. Note, Availability
of Divestiture, supra note 6, at 269. Courts have required only that a reasonable probability
be shown that a corporate merger will adversely affect competition in section 7 cases. Id. In
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for any antitrust violation that threatens loss or damage, section 16
of the Clayton Act, permits private litigants to maintain suits for
injunctive relief.24 Under the authority of section 16, an individual
may sue to enjoin anticompetitive practices in violation of section 7,
thereby frustrating the consummation of a merger in restraint of
trade or commerce.2
When a corporate merger in violation of section 7 has occurred,
divestiture of the illegal acquisition is a natural remedy 6 for two
reasons. First, divestiture of the unlawfully acquired stock or assets
restores competition.27 Second, divestiture deprives the antitrust vio-
lator of the illegally obtained stock or assets. 28
In the Clayton Act, Congress recognized the futility of requiring
a completed corporate integration in restraint of trade before per-
mitting an individual to bring suit and obtain injunctive relief.29 The
difference between ordinary injunctive relief and divestiture is largely
one of timing. Normal injunctive relief is effective when a litigant
seeks to prevent an illegal act. Divestiture becomes necessary when
the litigant seeks to eliminate the effects of a completed wrongful
business practice. 30 Refusing to order divestiture under section 16
order to obtain an injunction prohibiting further acquisitions by the offending corporation,
the litigant must establish a threat of loss or damage from the acquisition. See Peacock, supra
note 6, at 57 (this requirement presents no real burden to the plaintiff since courts are inclined
to assume that an acquisition in violation of section 7 in restraint of trade causes loss or
damage to the litigant). Id.
24. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1987) (making available treble damages and
attorney's fees to private litigants injured by violations of the antitrust laws).
25. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3 , at 587-88.
26. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). "The
very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy. It should
always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found."
(emphasis added). Id. at 331.'
27. See generally Rogowsky, The Economic Effectiveness of Section 7 Relief, 31 ANTITRUST
BurL. 187 (1986) (the article evaluates the effectiveness of merger relief in government § 7
cases).
28. Note, The Use of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 269.
29. Previously, the Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the Sherman Act to exclude
individuals from initiating suits for injunctive relief. See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal 244 U.S.
459 (1917). The decision in Paine was delivered after the enactment of the Clayton Act.
Nevertheless, the Court reached the conclusion that private litigants could not maintain a suit
for an injunction based on prior law, since the case was filed before 1914.). Peacock, supra
note 6, at 67, n.68.
30. To illustrate, a corporation whose stock is being acquired by a competitor may sue
to enjoin further purchases of stock. In many instances the target corporation may obtain
restrictions on the stock already acquired to neutralize the anticompetitive effect of the
acquisition. However, bare equity ownership of a competitor is incompatible with the objectives
of the antitrust laws. Most importantly, the stock remains in the hands of a competitor rather
than in the possession of motivated investors interested in increased revenues and expansion.
In this instance, divestiture is the only effective remedy and should be available. See Peacock,
supra note 6, at 56.
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penalizes an individual for suing prior to the consummation of a
corporate merger since individuals are unable to obtain effective relief
from anticompetitive integrations. The law entitles the government
to both forms of relief,31 but divesture has never been awarded to a
private litigant.
Financial constraints 32 and other non-legal reasons33 limit the ability
of the government to prosecute antitrust violations. 34 By enacting
section 16 Congress promoted a competitive economy in two ways.
First, section 16 provides a remedy to private litigants when the
government fails to act against violations of the antitrust laws.3 5
Second, section 16 enhances the enforcement of the antitrust laws
31. Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1987). Section 15 of the Clayton Act states:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of [the Clayton Act], and it shall be the duty of the
•.. Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations. Such proceedings may be by the way of petition setting forth the case
and praying that such violation be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 15 has been interpreted to permit the government to seek
divestiture. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961)
(divestiture should always be considered when § 7 has been violated, because divestiture is
simple, relatively easy to administer, and a sure remedy).
32. Peacock, supra note 6, at 80-81; Note, The Use Of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 263;
Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 272 n.32; Comment, Private Divestiture,
supra note 3, at 570 n.10.
33. Note, The Use Of Divestiture, sipra note 7, at 263, n.20; Peacock, supra note 6, at
80 n.137. See e.g. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F.Supp. 1153, 1185
(D.Haw. 1972) rev'd, 518 F.2d 913, 924 (1975). ITT obtained a no-action letter from the
government regarding the proposed acquisition of United Utilities, Inc. Id. at 1185. The letter
stated that no action would be taken against ITT unless or until action had been taken against
industry members which were similarly vertically integrated. Id. One or both of two reasons
convinced the government to postpone prosecuting ITT. First, as the court indicated, the
government may have decided to maintain a consistent enforcement policy in connection with
the telephone industry, since similar vertical relationships affected an extremely high percentage
of the total market. Id. Additionally, given the unique circumstances in the telephone and
telephone equipment industries, as the American Telephone & Telegraph Company break-up
indicates, the government at one time believed the telephone communications industry would
be more efficient if restricted to a few companies. Id.
34. For instance, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, the
agencies primarily charged with enforcing the antitrust laws, operate with a limited amount of
resources, and hence are unable to prosecute every alleged antitrust violation. Note, Availability
of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 272. Consequently, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission prioritize the complaints alleging antitrust infractions. Cases which establish
precedent for the illegality of contested practices in restraint of trade are favored over those
requiring long and costly litigation in order to prove known violations. Peacock, supra note,
at 80.
35. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 274-75; Note, The Use of
Divestiture, supra note 7, at 263 n.17 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 16319 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Floyd)). "Private suits were intended to provide 'the business men of the country' a means
of obtaining remedies 'without waiting upon the slow and tortuous course of prosecution on
the part of the Government."' Id. at 263 n.18.
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by enlisting the individual as a private attorney general. 6 An analysis
of the language Congress adopted as section 16 will offer insight
into the scope of injunctive relief Congress intended for the private
litigant.
DWESTTURE THROUGH INDIRECT MEANS
The language of section 16 of the Clayton Act expresses no
limitations on the power a court of equity has to order injunctive
relief.17 Rather, section 16 provides that injunctive relief may be
awarded to a private litigant to the extent permitted by the courts
of equity.38 Divestiture is a form of affirmative injunctive relieP 9 in
which the court orders an offending corporation to dispose of the
illegally obtained assets or stocks. 4° Although injunctions requiring
affirmitive acts were once held to be outside the equity powers of
the courts,4 today mandatory injunctions4 are available in appro-
priate circumstances. 43
The district court in the ITT case suggested that divestiture should
be available under section 16 since a court, by utilizing creative
prohibitory injunctions, could effectuate an order of divestiture in-
36. The Supreme Court has emphasized the enforcement function of private suits as a
guide to interpreting section 16: "[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-damages and
injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief but was to serve as well the high
purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 130 (1969). See also Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968) (the Court declined to recognize the defense of in pari delicto in private antitrust
actions, since the application of the doctrine would undermine the important role served by
private antitrust suits in enforcing the antitrust laws); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can Co.,
330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947) (indicating that Congress clearly intended to use private antitrust
actions as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws). Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes
treble damages and attorney fees for the private litigant as potential remedies. 15 U.S.C, § 15
(1986).
37. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978). "Nothing on the face of the
statute suggests a congressional intent to limit [the types of injunctions a court may order]."
Id. See also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980); CIA Petrolera Caribe v. Arco
Caribbean, 754 F.2d 404, 416 (1985).
38. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1986). See supra note 4 and accompanying text
(text of § 16).
39. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (1965).
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (definition of divestiture).
41. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 580-81.
42. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 580-81; Note, ThM Use Of
Divestiture, supra note 7, at 266. "A mandatory injunction is an order to carry out an
affirmative act, as opposed to the more usual prohibitory injunction, which forbids the doing
of an act." D. DoBns, TBE LAW OF REMEDIES 105 (1973).
43. Greenspun v. McCarren, 105 F.Supp 662 (D. Nev. 1952). "A court of equity may
require affirmative action where circumstances demand it." Id. at 664.
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directly. 44 For instance, courts of equity might place voting and other
restrictions on the stock already acquired by the defendant, while
enjoining the issuer of the stock from paying dividends on the shares
obtained by the offender. 45 These restrictions effectively frustrate any
competitive advantage of the corporate offender and thereby leave
the antitrust violator with no alternative but to dispose of the illegally
obtained stock.4 Two cases in which indirect divestiture was ordered
are Standard Oil Co. v. United States7 and American Crystal Sugar
Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co. 48 In Standard Oil, the Supreme
Court restrained the defendant from voting the acquired stock or
exercising any control over the susbsidiaries. 49 The subsidiaries were
enjoined from paying dividends on the shares owned by Standard
Oil.5 0 In American Crystal Sugar, the defendant was enjoined from
voting the acquired shares and from obtaining representation on the
board of directors of the offended corporation.."
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in ITT ruled that
divestiture could not be achieved in private antitrust actions through
"verbal calisthenics" when divestiture could not be ordered directly.52
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Congressional intent of section
16 was to exclude divestiture in private actions.5 3 Permitting divesti-
ture by indirect means would be inconsistent with this legislative
intention.54 The court indicated that the Standard Oil decree, in
effect, directing divestiture was permissible.55 The government may
achieve divestiture indirectly, since the government can obtain an
explicit divestiture order.56 Therefore, the Standard Oil decision was
44. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1207 (D.
Haw. 1972), rev'd, 518 F.2d 913, 924 (1975). See, e.g., Kay Instrument Sales Co. v. Haldex
Aktiebolag, 296 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Kay Instrument, the defendant allegedly
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the
defendent not to refuse to sell to plaintiff. Id. at 587.
45. See e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd 259 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1958).
46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
48. 152 F.Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Int'l
Tel. & Tel. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec., 518 F.2d at 924.
49. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 79.
50. Id.
51. American Crystal Sugar, 152 F.Supp. at 400.
52. ITT, 518 F.2d at 924.
53. Id. at 922.
54. Id. at 924. (The American Crystal Sugar case, the product of another circuit court
of appeals, was not binding on the Ninth Circuit.)
55. Id.
56. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). Section 15
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not binding precedent for the court, since ITT, a private litigant,
initiated the action rather than the United States.
Interestingly, neither court mentioned Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad.57 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the state of
Georgia was a person for the purposes of section 16.58 The Court
enjoined a rate fixing conspiracy even though the practical effect of
the injunction might be the dissolution of the combination. 9 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that indirect divestiture or dissolution was
an available form of relief to a person under section 16.60 Conse-
quently, there appears to be no reason why divestiture could not be
achieved directly, since divestiture may be achieved indirectly through
negative injuctions.
A second argument in favor of divestiture as a remedy authorized
by section 16 is that the courts possess inherent powers to effectuate
equity. Thus, the courts can order divestiture in appropriate circum-
stances despite the lack of express authority in section 16.61 Judicial
powers of equity, however, may be limited by a clear and valid
legislative command. 62 No express Congressional intention to limit
has been interpreted as permitting the government to seek the remedy of divestiture. Id. at
331. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (text of § 15)...
57. 324 U.S. 439 (1945)
58. "Georgia asserts rights based on the anti-trust [sic] laws. The fact that the United
States may bring criminal prosecutions or suits for injunctions under those laws does not mean
that Georgia may not maintain the present suit. Georgia sues as a proprietor to redress wrongs
suffered by it as the owner of a railroad and as the owner and operator of various public
institutions. Georgia, suing for her own injuries, is a 'person' within the meaning of § 16 of
the Clayton Act; she is authorized to maintain suits to restrain violations of the anti-trust [sic]
laws or to recover damages by reason thereof." (citation omitted) Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad, 324 U.S. at 447.
59. The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Pennslyvania Railroad stated:
So long as the colloboration which exists exceeds lawful limits and continues in
operation, the only effective remedy lies in dissolving the combination or in con-
forming it within legitimate boundaries. Dissolution of illegal combinations or a
restriction of their conduct to lawful channels is a conventional form of relief
accorded in anti-trust [sic] suits. If the alleged combination is shown to exist, the
decree which can be entered will be no idle or futile gesture. It will restore that
degree of competition envisaged by Congress when it enacted the Interstate Commerce
Act. It will eliminate from rate-making the collusive practices which the anti-trust
[sic] laws condeam and which are not sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Act.
It will supply an effective remedy without which there can be only an endless effort
to rectify the continuous injury inflicted by the unlawful combination. And no
adequate or effective remedy other than this suit is suggested which Georgia can
employ to eliminate the unlawful conspiracy alleged to exist here.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 324 U.S. at 461-62 (emphasis added). See also Peacock, supra note 6,
at 75; Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 592.
60. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 75.
61. "The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to
light inferences, or doubtful construction." Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836).
62. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). See, e.g., United States v.
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the type of injunctive relief available to the courts of equity appears
in the language of section 16.63 Instead, the language authorizes
injunctive relief to the extent permitted by general principles of
equity. 64
THE LANGUAGE OF SECTIONS 15 AND 16 OF T CLAYTON ACT
The language of section 15, which entitles the government to
equitable relief, is similar in meaning to that of section 16.65 The
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 n.9 (1961) (The Department of Justice
claimed that divestiture is required for section 7 violations since section 11 expressly authorizes
divestiture for the Federal Trade Commission for section 7 violations. The Court responded
that Congress could not be deemed to have restricted the broad remedial powers of courts of
equity absent explicit language so doing or some other strong indication of intent.).
63. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 417. The court in Arco Caribbean stated:
The plain language of 16 fails to indicate by either 'a clear and valid legislative
command,' or even a veiled suggestion, any intended limitation of the types of
injunctive relief available to private litigants under § 16. Nor do we find any
indication of intention to limit the district court's inherent powers of equity.
Id. Contra Int'l Tel. & Tel. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec., 518 F.2d at 921-22 (1975) (the court
interpreted the legislative history of section 16 as excluding divestiture in private actions). See
also note 4 and accompanying text (text of §16).
64. See supra note 4 (text of § 16).
At the time the Clayton Act was passed, a split in authority existed among the
circuits regarding the availability of injunctive relief to a private party suing under
the Sherman Act. Although the Sherman Act expressly conferred the power to initiate
'proceedings in equity' for injunctive or other equitable relief only upon the govern-
ment, the Sixth Ciruit affirmed a case where the district court had granted a
preliminary injunction to a private party pusuant to its inherent powers of equity.
Through the injunction, the court had forbidden an acquiring corporation to vote
the stock of its new acquistion, and then, after trial, had dissolved the injunction
and dismissed the bill. Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 F.2d 869 (W.D.
Mich. 1907), aff'd, 167 F. 704 (6th Cir. 1909). The Second Circuit, however, held
that injunctions were not available to private parties under the Sherman Act. See
Greater New York Film Rental Co. v. Biograph Co., 203 Fed. 39 (2d Cir. 1913).
These cases, and the question whether inherent powers of equity were withdrawn
from the courts under the Sherman Act, were discussed in the committee hearings
on section 16. See S. Hearings on S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 629-31
(issue and cases) (1914); H. Hearings on H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 485-87
(case), 963-64 (issue but not cases) (1914). Notably, then, no exclusion of inherent
powers of equity, or of certain kinds of injunctive relief, was included in the Clayton
Act.
CIA Petrolera Caribe v. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 417, n.10.
65. Compare Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1987) (entitles persons to injunctive relief
for antitrust infractions) with id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1987) (authorizes the government to
enjoin or otherwise prohibit antitrust violations). See supra note 4 (text of § 16); supra note
31 (text of § 15). See also Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1987). Section 11 states that the
Federal Trade Commission:
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to
cease and desist from such violations, and divest itself of the stock [or other share
capital, or assets] held or rid itself of the directors chosen contrary to the provisions
of sections seven and eight of this Act.
Id. The Supreme Court has never agreed that the remedy of divestiture is unavailable to the
Department of Justice because such specific language providing for divestiture does not appear
in section 15. Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 584, n.106.
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government may, under section 15 of the Clayton Act, institute
proceedings in equity to enjoin or otherwise prohibit antitrust vio-
lations.66 Under section 16, any person may sue for injunctive relief
when threatened with loss or damage by such violations. 67 Although
neither section expressly authorizes the remedy of divestiture in
antitrust actions, section 15 has been interpreted to include the remedy
of divestiture. 68 Two reasons may be advanced to explain the different
interpretation given to the two sections. First, divestiture may be
appropriate under section 15, and not section 16, on the basis that
"proceedings in equity" are dissimilar from "suits for injunctive
relief".69 Secondly, the phrase "to otherwise prohibit" of section 15
justifies divestiture in government actions whereas no similar language
is found in section 16 of the Clayton Act.70
Divestiture is within the ambit of injunctive relief as presently
conceived and practiced.71 Consequently, a conclusion that the sta-
tutory language "proceedings in equity" embraces divesture while
"actions for injunctive relief" does not is difficult to reach, given
contemporary legal use. This conclusion can only be based upon a
historical meaning of the language, or upon a finding that the
legislative history indicates that a distinction was intended by Con-
gress.72 The ITT court determined that equitable proceedings and
injunctive relief had different meanings. 73 After examining the legis-
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (text of § 15).
67. See supra note 4 (text of § 16).
68. The right of government to seek divestiture originated in Standard Oil v. United
States. 221 U.S."I (1917). In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court indicated that a proper remedy
is one which will effectively dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 78. The court held that the government was entitled to divestiture under section 4
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 30. Section 15 of the Clayton Act was considered a reenactment
of section 4 of the Sherman Act. Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 589. The
language of section 4 of the Sherman Act and section 15 of the Clayton Act is identical,
except for a service and summons clause at the end of section 15. Compare Sherman Act §
4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1987) with Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1987).
69. Int'l Tel. & Tel. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec., 518 F.2d at 913, 923-24 (1975).
70. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 278 (expressing doubt that the
phrase "to otherwise prohibit" of section 15 was intended to confer exclusively on the
government the ability to obtain divestiture).
71. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 278. See also CIA Petrolera
Caribe v. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d. at 404 (indicating that that the Ninth Circuit in 1TT
apparently conceded that divestiture is presently considered a form of injunctive relief). See
also Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (divestiture
is a form of injunctive relief).
72. See infra notes 91 through 150 and accompanying text (discussion of the legislative
history of § 16).
73. 17T, 518 F.2d at 922.
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lative history of the Clayton Act, the court concluded that injunctive
relief was not intended to include divestiture. 74
In CIA Petrolera Caribe v. Arco Caribbean, the First Circuit
indicated that a court is not free to disregard the contemporary
meaning of statutory language. 75 The court reasoned that a restrictive
interpretion of the injunctive relief would be inappropriate, given the
absence of a clear statutory limitation of the term and the growth
of equitable powers over time.76 In addition, the courts are required
to interpret a remedial statute generously. 77 The court held that the
express statutory language of sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act
did not establish a distinction between "proceedings in equity" and
suits for "injunctive relief."' 78 The court, therefore, found no prin-
cipled basis upon which to exclude divestiture in private actions while
permitting divestiture in government suits. 79
A second explanation for the denial of divestiture to private
litigants is that section 15 entitles the court to "enjoin or otherwise
prohibit" antitrust violations. 80 This phrase is arguably broader in
scope than the phrase "injunctive relief" in section 16. To assume
that the words, "otherwise prohibit," uniquely empower government
to utilize divestiture as a remedy may be illogical.81 Congress specif-
ically empowered the Federal Trade Commission to seek divestiture
orders in section 11 of the Clayton Act 2 and could have incorporated
the same specific language for government enforcement under section
15. Of course, section 15 was a reenactment of section 4 of the
Sherman Act 3 under which divestiture was ruled available. 84 Never-
74. Id. at 922. The 1914 definition of injunctive relief the Ninth Circuit reached was
primarily based on comments made by Representative Floyd in the House Judiciary Committee
Hearings on section 16. Id. (the analysis of the ITT court with respect to the legislative history
and the conclusion that injunctive relief, as understood in 1914, did not include divestiture is
reserved for the discussion of the legislative history of section 16). See infra notes 91 through
150 accompanying text.
75. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 418.
76. Id. The First Circuit recognized that legal concepts are susceptible of varying inter-
pretations over time. Id.
77. Id. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d
910, 919 (1st Cir. 1983).
78. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 418.
79. Id. at 418.
80. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 583 and 589; Note, Availability
of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 278. See also, supra notes 4 and 31 (text of § 16 and § 15).
81. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 583 and 589; Note, Availability
of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 278. See also Peacock, supra note 6, at 76 n.118.
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (text of § 11).
83. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested that
divestiture is contemplated in both § 15, by extension from the history of § 4 of the Sherman
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theless, Congress could have specifically provided for divestiture in
section 15 since Congress did so in section 11. Congressional materials
do not indicate that the omission of the phrase "to otherwise
prohibit" from section 16 was intended to preclude divestiture in
private antitrust suits. From a comparison of sections 15 and 16, the
government is unable to assert any more of a legal right to divestiture
than the private litigant.85 The government, however, is entitled to
divestiture notwithstanding the similar legal implications arising from
the language of sections 15 and 16.86 Therefore, section 16 should
be interpreted as providing the remedy of divestiture in private actions
since the government is entitled to such relief under section 15.87 The
debate continues, however, over whether a Congressional intention
to exclude divestiture as a remedy authorized by "injunctive relief"
may be found in the legislative history of section 16.88
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 16
A. "Dissolution" As a Point of Reference
The legislative materials on the Clayton Act do not refer to the
term divestiture 9 Therefore, other forms of injunctive relief referred
to at the time, such as dissolution and partition, are critical in
interpreting the legislative history of section 16. Ascertainment of
the relationship between these concepts and divestiture is a prereq-
uisite of any discussion of the legislative history.9°
Act, and in § 16, the private corollary to § 15. Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3,
at 589.
84. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911). In construing § 4 of
the Sherman Act the Court decided divestiture was available in government antitrust actions.
The Court, however, did not mention whether or not the power to order divestiture was
derived from the provision of the statute conferring upon the court the power to do equity
or from the language authorizing the court to "otherwise prohibit" antitrust violations.
Congress, therefore, had every reason to expressly provide for divestiture in section 15 and
explicitly deny divestiture in section 16, in order to effectively define the equitable powers the
courts are to possess under these statutes.
85. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 583, 589; Note, Availability Of
Divestiture, supra note 7, at 278; Peacock, supra note 6, at 76. See also CIA-Petrolera Caribe
v. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d 404, 417-18 (1985).
86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (text of § 15).
87. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 418.
88. An unambiguous statute is conclusive unless a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary is present. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 416.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In ITT v. GTE,91 the court relied on Standard Oil Co. v. United
States92 in concluding that the term "dissolution" includes the notion
of divestiture. 93 In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court ordered the
defendant to divest itself of the illegally acquired stock of the
subsidiary corporations. 94 The order of divestiture in Standard Oil,
however, was referred to as "dissolution of the illegal combination." 95
Since Congress discussed Standard Oil in conjunction with section
16, the 1TT court opined that divestiture was considered by Congress
when determining whether or not to authorize private dissolution
suits. 96 Consequently, the court in ITT held that if Congress intended
to exclude "dissolution" from relief authorized by section 16, then
"divestiture" was prohibited as well.97 Therefore, "divestiture" was
substituted for "dissolution" when the IT court reviewed the leg-
islative history of section 16.98
In Arco Caribbean, the First Circuit rejected the substitution of
divestiture for dissolution29 Rather, the court argued that the inter-
pretations of the distinction between "dissolution" and "divestiture"
in 1914 were varied and complex. 100 The court noted that the relief
ordered in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,10 was considered
by Congress to constitute divestiture. 102 In American Tobacco, the
Supreme Court suggested that "dissolution" may be accomplished
by dissolving illegal market power, selling illegally acquired assets,
91. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
92. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
93. ITT, 518 F.2d at 922 (the ITT Court rejected the technical distinction "that the
members of the House Judiciary Committe used the term 'dissolution' in a 'technical' sense
to mean 'complete destruction of a corporation."'). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at
419.
94. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 78.
95. ITT, 518 F.2d at 924. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31
(1911).
96. 77, 518 F.2d at 924. "Congress knew what the Supreme Court had approved of by
way of remedy in Standard Oil; in the hearings on § 16 [Congress] considered and rejected
proposals to extend the right to obtain that type of relief [divestiture] to private parties." Id.
at 924.
97. Id. at 922.
98. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422. See also ITT, 518 F.2d at 924; H.R. No. 627, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. at 263 (Rep. Floyd); at 273 (Rep. Nelson); at 331 (Rep. McCoy); 51 Cong.Rec.
at 15821-23 (Sept. 28, 1914) (Sen. Reed); id. at 15864 (Sept. 29, 1914) (Sen. Reed); id. at
15864-5 (Sen. Overman).
99. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422.
100. Id. at 421. "It appears that over the years the legal meaning of the concepts
'dissolution' and 'divestiture' have become somewhat more settled than in 1914, so much so
that the Supreme Court has recently pronounced them to be a [sic] 'large degree inter-
changeable."' Id. n.19.
101. 221 U.S. 106, 184-88.
102. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 418-19.
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or dissolving the offending corporation. 103 Moreover, the First Circuit
noted that other members of Congress equated "dissolution" with
"the complete destruction and reorganization" of the offending
enterprise. 1' 4 The Arco Caribbean court concluded, therefore, that
divestiture could not be substituted for dissolution in reviewing
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 05 Any review of the legislative history
of section 16 which merely substitutes the word "divestiture" for
"dissolution" is deficient because the legislative history indicates that
in 1914 dissolution was a general term subject to several interpreta-
tions.
B. Committee Reports
The official committee reports of Congress are entitled to substan-
tial weight as indicia of the intentions of Congress."' Neither the
report of the House of Representatives nor the Senate report indentify
any intended limits on the scope of injunctive relief available to
individuals under section 16.10 The committee reports, therefore, do
103. Id. at 421.
"The combination's market power could effectively be dissolved by a prohibitory
injunction forbidding the corporation from engaging in interstate commerce, with
the result that the offending combination partitions itself, sells assets, or otherwise
restricts itself in a manner that recreates a competitive market. Or, the court could
take a more active role as by appointing a receiver to sell assets in such a manner
as to restore market conditions. Or, in lieu of either of these two drastic remedies,
the court could encourage the formulation of a consent decree under the direction
of the court .... Today, as then, we would say that dissolution achieved through
the use of any of these mechanisms were achieved by use of the injuctive power
according to principles of equity."
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177, 192-93 (E.D. Mo. 1909), aff'd,
221 U.S. 1 (1911).
104. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 421.
"[V]hen the Second Circuit, on remand in American Tobacco, fashioned relief
according to what it conceived to be mandated by the Supreme Court's order for
'dissolution,' some members of Congress considered this not to be a dissolution in
fact, but merely a 'circuitous course' by which that end was not achieved."
Id. at 421. See, e.g., 51 Cong. Rec. 16326 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1914) (remarks of Rep. Nelson);
51 Cong.Rec. 15864 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1914) (remarks of Sen. Reed).
Evidently this perspective was shared by some officials in the Justice Department.
'The fundamental weakness in the enforcement of the antitrust act in previous
administrations was the failure to insist upon a real dissolution of monopolies and
combinations which the courts had adjudged unlawful' (excerpt from Justice Dept.
letter quoted by Sen. Reed).
(citations omitted). Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 421 n.18.
105. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422.
106. United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). See also ITT, 518 F.2d at
921; Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422.
107. H.Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1914); S.Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1914). "The [House] Report fails to identify any intended limits on the scope of injunctive
relief available to private parties." Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422. "The Senate report
merely reproduced the House report in its entirety." Id. at 423.
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not establish a legislative intention to limit the scope of injunctive
relief which is provided by section 16.103 Significantly, the House
Minority Report, expressing reservations about the broad scope of
private relief authorized by section 16, indicated that some committee
members feared that section 16 injunctive relief would encompass
dissolution and corporate reorganization.' °9 Consequently, the House
Minority Report indicates that some Representatives understood sec-
tion 16 as permitting the actual termination of an offending corpo-
ration. Less formal indicia of Congressional intent, such as floor
debates and hearings, are entitled to consideration in the interpreta-
tion of legislative history in the absence of a clear statement of Con-
gressional intent in the committee reports."10
C. Floor Debates
The remarks on the floor of the Senate or House by the sponsor
of a bill are entitled to substantial weight as evidence of Congressional
intent."' Representative McGillicuddy did not mention any implied
limitations on the scope of injunctive relief that may be awarded in
private actions under section 16.112 In addition, Representative Carlin 3
stated that the House Judiciary Committee intended the bill to give
the individual the same power to enjoin antitrust violations as the
government commanded. 14 In sum, the comments made on the floor
108. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 423.
109. Minority Views, pt. 2 to H.R. 15637, H.R.Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
The provision giving to any individual the right to enjoin any threatened loss or
damage is a serious one.... The beginning of an investigation by the government
on any complaint that a concern has violated the antitrust laws almost immediately
to some extent affects his credit but not so seriously as an injunction and perhaps
receivership which might be brought by an individual.
Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 422 n.21.
While the fears and doubts of the minority are not an authorative guide to the
construction of legislation, their report did comprise the only specific explanation
of the meaning of the private injunction provision that was readily accessible to the
whole Congress.
Id. (citation omitted).
110. See ITT, 518 at 921 n.37.
111. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1981); FEA v. Algonquin
SNO, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
112. 51 Cong.Rec. 9261 (1914). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 423.
113. Representative Carlin coauthored the bill with Representatives Clayton and Floyd.
114. Representative Carlin defended the bill by stating:
First, we found that the Sherman law did not permit an injunction on petition of
an individual. The Government could enjoin a combination or trust; and though an
individual was standing face to face with destruction, though the monster of
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
in the House of Representatives suggest a desire, on the part of the
sponsors of the Clayton Act, to arm the private litigant with an
effective arsenal of weapons to combat business practices in restraint
of trade." 5
The Senate debated a similar bill authorizing private suits seeking
injunctive relief for antitrust violations. Senator Shields remarked
that section 16 would empower individuals to bring suits in equity
to enjoin violations of antitrust laws to the same extent as the
government under section 4 of the Sherman Act." 6 Notably, the
Senate passed a floor amendment, section 25, which would have
required a court to decree a dissolution whenever a corporate defend-
ant was guilty of anticompetitive acts, without regard to the nature
of the plaintiff."7
Senate amendment section 25 was not passed by the conference
committee in the reconciliation of the House and Senate bills."' One
inference to be drawn from the failure to enact section 25 is that
Congress intended dissolution to be unavailable in private antitrust
suits." 9 Although section 25 did not differentiate between types of
monoploy was knocking at his door, he would have to wait until destruction came,
and then pursue his remedy at law for treble damages. So ... the committee,
proposed to place in this bill a law which allows the individual to sue for equitable
relief and to enjoin monopoly when he is threatened with irreparable loss or damage.
51 Cong.Rec. 9270 (1914) (emphasis added). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 423-24.
115. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 423-24.
116. 51 Cong.Rec. 14,215 (1914). See also, Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3,
at 590.
117. Senate amendment, section 25 read:
Whenever a corporation shall acquire or consolidate the ownership or control of the
plants, franchises or property of other corporations, copartnerships, or individuals,
so that it shall be adjudged to be a monopoly or combination in restraint of trade,
the court rendering such judgment shall decree its dissolution and shall to that end
appoint receivers to wind up its affairs and shall cause all of its assets to be sold
in such manner and to such persons as will, in the opinion of the court, restore
competition as fully and completely as it was before said combination began to be
formed. The court shall reserve in its decree jurisdiction over said assets so sold for
a sufficient time to satisfy the court that full and free competition is restored and
assured. (emphasis added).
51 Cong.Rec. 15863 (1914). The First Circuit noted that the Senate amendment indicates
greater conflict over the meaning of "dissolution" than the Ninth Circuit acknowledges, since
the amendment refers to dissolution as the termination of the illegal combination. Arco
Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 424. (Ultimately, Senate amendment § 25 was excluded from § 16 of
the Clayton Act by the conference committee.)
118. H.Rep. No. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914); S.Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1914). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 424-25. "INleither [the Senate nor the House
Conference Report] mentioned the Senate amendment except to note the Senate 'recede[s]."'
Id.
119. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
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plaintiffs, 20 the repeal of section 25 has not prevented the government
from obtaining divestiture.12 1 Moreover, alternative language which
would have made dissolution permissive rather than mandatory and
would have limited the availability of the remedy to the government
was also rejected. 122 Additionally, the proposed Senate amendment
to section 16 is an example of another interpretation accorded the
term "dissolution. ' - 3
Consequently, no Congressional intention to limit the scope of
injunctive relief authorized by section 16 is evidenced by the remarks
of the representatives charged with explaining the proposal to their
colleagues. To the contrary, the floor debates indicate that both the
House and the Senate intended the scope of injunctive relief of
section 16 to be extensive and unrestrictive1 24
D. Conference Committee Reports And Debates
Representative Floyd, co-author of the Clayton Act, explained the
conference bill to the House and noted that prior to the proposed
section 16 only the government could enjoin an unlawful trust or
monopoly in restraint of trade. 125 Floyd implied that with the passage
120. Id. at 425. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (text of Senate Amendment §
25).
121. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
122. 51 Cong. Rec. 16325-26 (Oct. 8, 1914) (remarks of Rep. Nelson, conference committe
member). See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
123. See supra notes 89 through 103 and accompanying text (discussion of "dissolution");
supra note 109 and accompanying text (discusion of the House Minority's understanding of
the term "dissolution").
124. The Ninth Circuit, in /, stated that "far from approving the exclusion of less
formal material, [the Supreme Court] has repeatedly interpreted legislation by referring to
statements made in floor debates and hearings." ITT, 518 F.2d at 921. The court, however,
makes no mention of any of the remarks made during legislative debate on section 16 by bill
sponsors and committee members. Instead, the Ninth Circuit relies principally on the comments
made by Congressman John Floyd during House Judiciary Committee Hearings in response
to Samuel Untermeyer, an antitrust attorney who advocated private dissolution suits for
antitrust violations. Id. at 922. See also infra notes 133 through 148 and accompanying text.
(Apparently, the Ninth Circuit looked beyond the statements made concerning section 16 on
the floors of the House and the Senate to find support for the decision of the court that
Congress intended to exclude divestiture for private antitrust cases. The decision of the Ninth
Circuit to accord principle weight to statements made during the House Hearings was improper
in light of other very relevant and reliable evidence of legislative intent.)
125. 51 Cong. Rec. 16319 (Oct. 8, 1914)). Congressman Floyd stated:
Heretofore there has been only one power that might enjoin an unlawful trust or
monopoly in restraint of trade, an that was the Government of the United States
.... This provision in § 16 gives any individual, company, or corporation damaged
in its property or business by the unlawful operations or actions of any corporation
or combination the right to go into court and enjoin the doing of these unlawful
acts ....
Id. (emphasis added) See also, Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425; supra notes 73 through 81
and accompanying text.
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of section 16 the right to enjoin illegal business practices would be
extended to the individual. Congressman Floyd's statement is signif-
icant in two respects. First, an explicit parallel between the power of
the government to obtain injunctive relief and that of the individual
under section 16 was stressed as an expressed purpose of the statute. 126
Alternatively, no distinction was mentioned between the injunctive
relief granted to the United States and that extended under section
16 to private individuals. 127 Secondly, Congressman Floyd's choice
of the word "enjoin" as descriptive of the power that both the
government and the individual would share suggests that the phrases
"proceedings in equity to enjoin" and "injunctive relief" were not
intended to represent a distiction supporting a prohibition of divest-
iture to the individual. 28 The conference committee reports and
debates also fail to clearly express a legislative intent to limit the
scope of injunctive relief under section 16.129 In addition, the con-
ference committee reports and debates do not establish "a clear and
valid legislative command" to restrict the inherent equitable powers
of a court to order divesture. 130
E. Committee Hearings'
Committee hearings, as the least formal indicia of Congressional
intent, are entitled to less credibility than committee reports 32 and
statements on the floor by the author of a bill. 33 The Ninth Circuit,
in ITT, placed great emphasis on Representative Floyd's responses
126. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 73 through 81 and accompanying text. (Section 15 authorizes the
courts to "enjoin or otherwise prohibit antitrust violations in government actions. Represent-
ative Floyd's use of the word 'enjoin' in his explanation of section 16 indicates further that
the words 'injunctive relief' and not "enjoin" in section 16 were not intended to disallow
divestiture in private antitrust actions.)
129. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 424-25. See also supra notes 108 through 126 and
accompanying text (demonstrating the lack of an express legislative intent in the committee
reports and floor debates to remove divestiture from the ambit of section 16 injunctive relief).
130. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 424-25.
131. The court in Arco Caribbean noted that:
When reviewed as a whole, only scant consideration was given in the hearings to
the remedy provisions, or the judicial 'machinery,' of the proposed act. In House
hearings that lasted over four months and filled over 2000 pages of record, the
testimony relating specifically to the scope of § 16 is contained in approximately
thirty pages.
Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
132. U.S. v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). See also ITT, 518 F.2d at 921.
133.' North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-527 (1981); FEA v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976).
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during committee hearings to Samuel Untermeyer, an advocate of
private dissolution suits. 134 Floyd indicated that the House Judiciary
Committee did not intend section 16 to authorize individuals, as
opposed to the government, to bring dissolution suits. 135
The context of the Floyd-Untermeyer exchange undermines the
significance of Representative Floyd's assertion that the committee
did not intend to give the individual litigant the power to seek
dissolution of a corporation. 136 At the time Floyd responded to
Untermeyer, public hearings had been in session less than a week.137
The hearings continued for some weeks, during which committee
members repeatedly sought the opinion of other invitees on the
question whether private litigants should be permitted to obtain the
dissolution of an offending corporation. 38  Despite Rep. Floyd's
remarks, therefore, the committee members were probably undecided
about the scope of the provision until some time after the public
hearings. 39
In addition, Rep. Floyd's reply to Untermeyer on February 6, 1914
is remarkably inconsistent with his explanation of the relief authorized
by section 16 on October 8.Y40 The February 6 statement was made
134. ITT, 518 F.2d at 922.
135. Hearings on H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 842 (February 6, 1914)). See also 17T,
518 F.2d at 922; Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425-26.
136. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 426.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 492 (1914); id. at 666; id. at
1049-53; id. at 1183. See also Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 404.
Our belief that Representative Floyd's comments cannot be taken as stating a
Judiciary Committee intention regarding the scope of § 16 is supported by an
exchange between Representative Floyd and a later witness. Floyd stated during the
hearings on February 27, 1914, in reference to another proposed section 'the purpose
of these provisions as tentatively drafted .... ' The next witness that day then begins
his comments by referring to that clarification and stating, 'but as that point has
been disposed by the committe ... it is unnecessary to discuss that phase.' Repre-
sentative Floyd responded: 'I think it has not been disposed of, Mr. Harlan. There
are 21 members of this Committee, and matters are not so easily disposed of. I
simply made an explanation as one member of the subcommittee that had prepared
the bill, as to my view of it. I would be very glad.., if you would state your
views....
Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 426, n.25 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 15657, 63d Cong. 2d Sess.
1049-53 (1914). The First Circuit concluded that Representative Floyd's remarks were insuffi-
ciently reliable to entitle a court to consider them in construing section 16. Arco Caribbean,
754 F.2d at 426. See also New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 342
(1982) ("Reliance on such isolated statements of legislative history in defining the intent of
Congress is an exercise fraught with hazards, and 'a step to be taken cautiously' (quoting
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)).
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. The latter statement by Congressman
Floyd should supersede his former comment, since committee hearings are entitled to less
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in the early stages of the legislative development of section 16,141
while his later statement occurred after the final bill had been
prepared by the conference committee. 142 Congressman Floyd's Oc-
tober 8 statement thus more accurately reflects the final intention of
Congress.
Finally, even if the Floyd-Untermeyer exchange does credibly in-
dicate Congressional intent, Rep. Floyd was only opposed to granting
an individual the power to sue for "dissolution" of an illegal
combination.' 43 The reply is significant only if Floyd intended "dis-
slution" to encompass divestiture. Some members of Congress equated
"dissolution" with the complete termination of an offending cor-
poration, a remedy entirely different from divestiture. 44 If Rep.
Floyd used the term in this way, his statement does not establish an
intent to prevent the private litigant from seeking divestiture. 41
Therefore, the Floyd-Untermeyer exchange is at best an ambiguious
expression of Congressional intent to prohibit the individual from
obtaining divestiture. The committee hearings do not clearly dem-
onstrate legislative intent to limit the scope of the "injunctive relief"
available under section 16.146
Both the purpose of section 16 to provide a remedy to persons
under the antitrust laws' 47 and the broad language incorporated into
the statute' 48 strongly suggest Congressional intent to allow the in-
dividual to obtain divestiture. This conclusion is reinforced by the
absence of a clear legislative intent to exclude divestiture in the
recorded proceedings on the statutory enactment of the bill. There-
fore, the remedy of divestiture should be available to the individual.
Several practical considerations, however, affect the matter of per-
mitting private divestiture actions.' 49
weight than remarks made by the sponsor of a bill on the floor of the House or Senate. See
Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 425.
141. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 426.
142. See supra notes 125 through 131 and accompanying text.
143. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 426.
144. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (text of House Minority Report).
145. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 426. "As divestiture of an acquisition can be so different
in degree of impact on a combination as to amount to a difference in kind, we cannot hold
[Congressman Floyd's] remarks to indicate a proscription of divestiture." Id. But cf. IM, 518
F.2d at 922. "We believe the circumstantial evidence indicates that by disallowing private suits
for 'dissolution' Congress also disallowed private 'divestiture' suits." Id. On the other hand,
if Representative Floyd understood dissolution as including divestitive, then on February 6 the
history would indicate that the committee intended to exclude divestiture from section 16
injunctive relief. Id.
146. Arco Caribbean, 754 F.2d at 428.
147. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (text of §16).
149. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 77.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Policies Against Divestiture
The historical reluctance of the courts to construe section 16 of
the Clayton Act as permitting divestiture may be due to the policy
arguments against divestiture as a remedy to private litigants. One
policy argument against the use of divestiture in private actions is
that a misuse of divestiture could harshly affect the defendant. 150 The
possibility that divestiture could be misused simply raises the question
of when the court should award the remedy.' 5' This concern should
In sum, courts were recoiling instinctively from a rule that might require them to
preside over the dismemberment of large corporations at the suit of comparatively
insignificant parties; in such cases the risk of harm far outweighed the possibility of
private benefit. The argument against authorizing private parties to sue for and
obtain divestiture is, then, purely a policy argument, and it must be approached as
such.
Id.
150. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 78; Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at
267. For example, a corporation may be forced to split up assets and management and to sell
the acquired stock with detrimental tax and price consequences. The rights of the stockholders
inevitably are affected by divestiture yet shareholders may later discover divestiture was
unnecessary to restore competition. Id.
151. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 78. Arnett v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 566 F.Supp. 1270
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). "Dismissal of plaintiff's claim under Clayton 7 [sic] on the ground that
rescission and divestiture are not available would be to rule as a matter of law that no other
form of injunctive relief would be appropriate .... Selection of an appropriate remedy, if
any, must await full development of the facts." Id. at 1274. Ohio-Seay Mattress Manufacturing
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 669 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982). "We need not decide today, however, whether
divestiture is ever available. We hold only that the district court did not err in refusing to
award divestiture in this case." Id. at 496; Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co.,
476 F.2d. 989 (5th Cir. 1973), 358 F.Supp. 780 (S.D. Texas 1971). "Divestiture, being the
severe measure that it is, should be avoided when other forms of injunctive relief can adequately
protect against the 'threatened injury' within section 16." Id. at 798; Julius M. Ames Co. v.
Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). "Divestiture is a form of injunctive relief.
It may or may not be appropriate, depending upon the circumstances." Id. at 526. See also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Calnetics v. Volkswagen of America, Civil
Nos. 73-1953, 73-1958 (9th Cir., filed 1973) (the Department of Justice noted that a court
may assume divestiture is appropriate in section 7 cases, unless there is a showing to the
contrary, since the Supreme Court has indicated divestiture is a natural remedy for such
violations). Additionally, the consequences of divestiture may be reduced since courts have
great flexibility in ordering injunctive relief and can shape divestiture decrees accordingly;
Note, The Use Of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 284.
Interests which are threatened by divestiture may be protected by the careful framing
of an order, which is '. . . capable of nice adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs . .. .' For example, the extent and timing of
divestiture can be adjusted to suit particular situations. Detailed supplementary
injunctions can be issued to ensure the viability of the divested concern, which will
in turn protect shareholders, employees, and consumers. (citations omitted)
Id. See generally Comment, Private Divestitute, supra note 3, at 601 (remarking that even if
the Supreme Court approves of divestiture in private actions, courts will nevertheless decree
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not determine the issue of whether or not such relief is permitted by
section 16. Additionally, the danger of misusing divestiture is no
greater when an individual is a plaintiff rather than the government
since a grant of divestiture is always left to the sound discretion of
the court and subject to the same equitable principles.
Another consideration against divestiture is that a private litigant
should not be able to obtain such a powerful remedy. 12 The argument
is that if the violation is so serious as to require divestiture, the
government would have initiated the antitrust suit.'53 This argument
presupposes that the government has both the ability and desire to
litigate every antitrust violation in which divestiture may be appro-
priate.15 4 Limited resources force the government to prosecute only
the most severe violationsY.5 5 Moreover, while the government is
successful in proving antitrust violations, the government generally
fails to obtain meaningful relief in antimerger cases .156 Finally, the
argument that government can adequately protect individual com-
petitors ignores the fact that one of the purposes of enacting the
Clayton Act was to provide individuals with an effective remedy for
anticompetitive acts 57 and to encourage private plaintiffs to enforce
the antitrust laws.15 8
Another objection against private divesiture suits is that a flood
of litigation designed to harass competitors would result.'59 The
the remedy infrequently because the private litigant lacks impartiality and the breadth of
information the government agencies possess.) A further factor that suggests the courts will
use divestiture sparingly is the tremendous amount of administration required by the court a
divestiture decree. Rogowsky, supra note 27.
152. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 77-78.
153. See id. at 78.
154. See id. at 80-81; Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 272. See also supra
notes 33 through 35 and accompanying text.
155. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 80-81; Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7,
at 272. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
156. See Rogowsky, supra note 27, at 188-216. The article indicates that the relief obtained
by the government in section 7 actions is a failure and when timeliness of the relief is considered
as a variable, the record of the government in achieving relief is a complete failure. Id. at
216. The results of this study demonstrate that the bundle of assets ordered divested usually
is substantially less than was acquired and inadequate to undo the perceived anticompetitive
effect. Id. at 202. In several instances no assets were ordered divested, at all. Id. at 209.
Moreover, nearly 75% of the orders were obtained more than four years after the acquisition
and divestiture agreements reached more than two years after the order. Id.
157. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 274-75; Note, The Use of
Divestiture, supra note 7, at 263 n.17. See supra notes 35 and 36 and accompanying text.
158. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969); Perma Life
Mufflers Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can
Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
159. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 281; Comment, Private Di-
vestitures, supra note 3, at 602.
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argument, however, applies equally to suits for treble damages and
injunctive relief. 160 Additionally, the cost of attorney fees acts as a
deterrent to nonmeritorious litigation.' 61 Further, the threat of a
malicious prosecution suit should also act to deter any potentially
unscrupulous plaintiff. Finally, the courts have decided that the threat
of frivolous litigation is an insufficient basis upon which to deny a
legitimate remedy.1 62 This reasoning should apply to private antitrust
litigation as well.163
An additional possibility militating against private divestiture is
that awarding an indiviual divestiture extinguishes any benefits which
may accrue to similarly situated competitors.'6 In this instance, like
competitors are affected differently by the antitrust violation. 65 To
remedy the apprehension of one competitor obtaining divestiture to
the disadvantage of other related competitors and to ensure that
other private and public interests are presented to the court, a few
measures are available. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide for joinder' 66 and intervention. 67 A court, in addition, could
grant leave to interested parties to file amici curiae briefs .168 Fur-
thermore, if a business practice is made illegal by the antitrust laws
it should be restrained, even though some competitors may benefit
from the actions of an unscrupulous business. 6 9 Finally, individual
160. See Note, Availability of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 281.
161. "IT]he availability of [attorney] fees under section 16 is unclear. There are arguments
for allowing fees when injunctive remedies are in the public good, therefore [sic] the courts
should be open to all claimants, without the deterrent of huge legal expenses. On the other
hand, it may be argued that the cost of litigation would serve as a control on the flood of
litigation that might otherwise occur." Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 602.
162. Id. at 602. A wholly frivolous claim is insufficient to state a cause of action under
the antitrust laws. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). However, a
complaint under the antitrust laws need not be set forth with the particularity of an indictment.
Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co. 165 F. 774 (1908).
163. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 602.
164. Id.
A vertical merger by one compeitor may adversely affect several others, yet some
competitors, both horizontal and in aligned fields of endeavor, may benefit: for
example, the horizontal competitor [may profit from the] excitement of consumer
demand caused by an infusion of capital, or the aligned competitor [may profit] in
the availability of a component at a lower price caused by economies of scale.
Id.
165. Id. at 603.
166. See FED. R. Civ. Paoc. 19 and 21. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3,
at 603; Note, The Use Of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 284.
167. See FED. R. Crv. PRoc. 24. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 603;
Note, The Use Of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 284.
168. See Note, The Use Of Divestiture, supra note 7, at 285 n.181. The United States may
file an amicus brief at the appellate level on its own motion. FED. R. APP. P. 29.
169. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 603.
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interests are more likely to be neglected when the government pros-
ecutes to divest an unlawful merger, 170 since an individual does not
have a right to intervene.'17  Therefore, a number of safeguards are
available to the courts to ensure the protection of other related
competitors.
A final pragmatic concern against private divestiture is the conflict
that may develop between the government and private parties t72 To
illustrate, a private divestiture suit might be initiated against an
offending corporation which had obtained a consent decree from the
government permitting the combination in question. 73 Any conflict
between the individual and the government may be resolved in the
discretion of the court. 74 The court is free to balance the equities
should a government consent decree be in effect. 75 A court could
consider factors such as changed circumstances from the time the
decree permitting the offending corporation was issued, the effect of
the combination on the competition within the field of enterprise,
and the degree to which the consent agreement benefits the public
interest, when balancing the equities.
170. Id.
171. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, A. & P., 80 F.Supp.
900, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (stating that individuals may seek leave to intervene in government
antitrust actions against ASCAP). Section 16 of the Clayton Act does not authorize intervention
in government antitrust actions. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1986). See also Note, Antitrust Enforcement
by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1035-36 (1952) (indicating that private parties cannot intervene "of right" in government
antitrust actions). FED. R. Crv. PRoc. 24 (a) provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2) when the representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be bound by a judgment in the action." Courts have
unifomly held that private individuals fulfill neither requirement in antitrust litigation. Note,
Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties, at 1036 n.171. See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944); Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683 (1961).
172. Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 602; Note, The Use Of Divestiture,
supra note 7, at 285.
173. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). "Clearly, the government is not forever bound by its consent
decrees, and may bring action to have such decrees reformed as made necessary by changing
conditions and circumstances." Id. See also ABA Section of Antitrust Laws, Antitrust
Developments 1955-1968 at 239 (1968) (a consent decree is binding only on those parties
present in the proceeding in which the decree was entered); Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961) A person whose private interests coincide with the public interest
in government antitrust litigation is not bound by such litigation and hence may not as of
right intervene in the government action. Id. at 689. Private and public actions were designed
to be cumulative, not mutually exclusive. Id.
174. Sam Fox Pub. Co., 366 U.S. at 689.
175. Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 662; Note, The Use of Divestiture,
supra note 7, at 285.
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Alternatively, courts might formulate a rule that makes a valid
consent decree prima facie evidence of legality only upon a showing
of mistake by the government in issuing the decree. 176 On the other
hand, the courts, in the spirit of judicial efficiency, may desire to
adopt a rule prohibiting per se private divestiture where a government
consent decree is already in force. A per se limitation on private
divestiture actions subsequent to a government consent decree does
not support the position that all private divestiture suits are imprac-
ticable. Rather, a per se limitation presupposes only that rights of
the individual should be subordinated to those of the government.
In sum, many of the policy arguments against allowing private
litigants to obtain divestiture simply do not withstand logical analysis.
In addition, the availability of divestiture in private, actions is sup-
ported by a number of policy considerations.
B. Policies In Support Of Divestiture
Policies favoring the remedy of divestiture in private antitrust suits
outweigh the practical concerns against the use of divestiture. One
sound policy reason for private divestiture is that courts should have
the power to dismantle an illegal combination that the courts could
have prevented from forming in the first place. 177 The Supreme Court
has noted that divestiture does not add to the sanctions imposed by
the antitrust laws.178 Rather, the aim of divestiture is to undo what
could have been prevented, namely, mergers in restraint of trade.1
79
A rule against divestiture effectively permits antitrust violations that
are executed rapidly. The offender may benefit more by retaining
the illegal organization than is lost through treble damages.180 Con-
sequently, denying divestiture to private litigants could frustrate the
purpose of the antitrust laws.' 8'
176. Id.
177. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 81.
178. Schine Chine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
To require divestiture of theatres unlawfully acquired is not to add to the penalties
that Congress has provided in the antitrust laws. Like restitution it merely deprives
the defendant of the gains from his wrongful conduct. It is an equitable remedy
designed in the public interest to undo what could have been prevented had the
defendents not outdistanced the government in their unlawful project.
Id. at 128.
179. See Schine Chine Theatres, 334 U.S. at 110.
180. See Peacock, supra note 6, at 81; See also CIA Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco
Caribbean, 754 F.2d 404, 430 (1st Cir. 1985). A competitor may profit by violating the
antitrust laws despite the possibility of a treble damage penalty, since lucrative illegal acqui-
sitions may be retained.
181. See supra notes 35 through 36 and accompanying text.
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The most important policy consideration in support of divestiture
is that there may be no other remedy that can afford adequate relief
to the private plaintiff.12 In the Ninth Circuit, where divestiture
orders are prohibited,183 the only relief available to the private plain-
tiff is an award of treble damages.'14 For a competitor that desires
to remain in business treble damages amount to no relief at all, since
an adversary, by voting the acquired shares, can affect business
decisions and probably obtain representation on the board of direc-
tors. In a takeover situation, the Ninth Circuit would even compel
the plaintiff to pay the antitrust violator dividends on the illegally
acquired stock. 85
Divestiture in private actions, in addition to providing relief to
litigants, benefits the public by restoring a competitive product line
in the affected market. 86 Treble damages, to the extent the illegal
acquisitions are retained by the offender, do not restore market
conditions to the same degree as a divestiture order. 87 Since the
government cannot prosecute every antitrust violation, 8  the deterrent
effect of the antitrust laws would be enhanced by making divestiture
a potential remedy to private parties. 189 A final benefit of divestiture
182. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 598. See generally Rogowsky,
supra note 28; Adams and Heimforth, The Effect Of Conglomerate Mergers On Changes In
Industry Concentration, 31 ANTITRUST BuLL. 133 (1986).
183. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 924 (9th Cir. 1975).
In jurisdictions permitting restrictions on stock that aim to neutralize the anticompetitive effect
of the acquisition, bare equity ownership of the stock is inconsistent with the objectives of
the antitrust laws. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
184. The deterrent effect of treble damages without the threat of divestiture is minimal. A
corporation that expects to earn substantial profits through an illegal merger may find the
integration profitable despite a damage award, since the corporation may retain the acquired
stock and conceivably the amount of profits earned could exceed the amount of damages. But
the remedies of divestiture and treble damage awards together have a very real deterrent effect.
An offending corporation will face paying out monetary damages and relinquishing control of
the illegal acquired stocks or assets. See Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at p.
598-99.
185. 17, 518 F.2d at 924 (prohibiting attempts at achieving divestiture indirectly).
186. See Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 598.
187. Id.
188. Id. See also supra notes 32 through 34 and accompanying text.
189. Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 598.
There also remains the deterrent effect of treble-damage actions, which plays directly
upon the divestiture deterrent. Consider, for example, the case in which a corporation
acquires a subsidiary through which it expects a high degree of profit. The threat
of divestiture may be considered and dismissed on the ground that the excessive
time lag between intiation of the claim, either by the Government or private party,
and the final decree will provide ample time for the accrual of profits that will far
outweigh the costs of litigation. However, the threat of large monetary damages
may take the profit motive out of the 'get away with it as long as you can' rationale.
Id. at 598-99.
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in private antitrust suits is that allowing divestiture would reduce the
large amount of litigation caused by government injunctive actions
and multiple private treble damage suits. 19° The amount of litigation
could be reduced since a private litigant, the first to intiate an
antitrust action against the questioned business practice, may obtain
a divestiture order, thereby terminating any further injury to other
related competitors and eliminating the need for the government to
sue for divestiture in cases of severe violations.191
Policy arguments against divestiture are insufficient to justify lim-
iting the scope of "injunctive relief" available under section 16 to
exclude the remedy of divestiture.'92 Furthermore, the policy argu-
ments in support of divestiture as an available remedy to private
litigants would promote three advantageous results. First, equity
would be effectuated; second, competitive economic conditions would
be strengthened; and, third, administrative costs and tasks would be
reduced. Policy considerations, therefore, dictate a need to allow
divestiture as an available remedy under section 16.
CONCLUSION
By enacting the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Congress established
the policy that free competition is the goal of the economy. By
enacting section 16 of the Clayton Act, Congress intended to provide
individual victims of antitrust violations with an equitable remedy
and to encourage their participation in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. Until recent years, however, section 16 had been narrowly
interpreted by the courts so as to prohibit the effective remedy of
divestiture. The availability of divestiture as a remedy to private
litigants is both legally and practically justified. Significantly, no
limitations or restrictions on the equitable powers of the courts are
expressed within the statutory langauge of section 16. Moreover, the
legislative history of section 16 does not indicate a clear Congressional
intention to limit or restict the "injunctive relief" authorized by the
section. Strong policy objectives also support the availability of
divestiture as a remedy in antitrust suits intiated by private litigants.
190. Comment, Private Divestiture, supra note 3, at 600.
191. Of course, several actions may still be required in instances where more than one
competitor has become injured before the divestiture of the anticompetitive merger. Treble
damage actions are evaluated on the basis of the individual damage of respective competitors.
Comment, Private Divestitures, supra note 3, at 600.
192. See supra notes 151 through 176 and accompanying text.
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Divestiture should be viewed as a potential remedy provided within
the "injunctive relief" authorized by section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Jeffrey G. Huron
